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Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to introduce and explore the trivia of accountability, which is indispensable for ensuring 
rule of law, human rights and good governance in a country. The paper intends to depict the theoretical aspects 
of accountability, its typology, mechanisms, and application in the governance. Special attention has focused on 
social accountability to evaluate the citizens’ involvement in public service delivery as well as in ensuring public 
accountability in the context of Bangladesh. There are various mechanisms and components in ensuring social 
accountability; however, three components–citizen charter, participatory budget making process, and access to 
information, have been selected and used for the present paper. Empirical data and experiences of the author 
have been analyzed to evaluate social accountability in Bangladesh. The major findings of this study are- social 
accountability is a very effective opportunity to engage citizens in the participatory governance process and it 
has been already introduced and applied in Bangladesh. However, the people of Bangladesh are still not aware 
enough about social accountability and its mechanisms. Besides, the officials are still bear colonial attitude and 
behavior instead of friendly service providers. 
Keywords: Accountability, social accountability, participatory budget making process, access to information, 
citizen charter, citizen engagement, governance, and Bangladesh. 
 
1. Introduction 
“Accountability is a fundamental norm in public administration, related to alluring promises 
of democratic governance, appropriate behavior, justice and better performance” (Dubnick 
and Frederickson 2011:17; Cited in Schillemans and Busuioc, 2014).  
Though, the concept ‘accountability’ is as old as civilization, however, it has been popularized as an Anglo-
Norman concept  by some OECD member countries  and some scholars like- Pollitt (1990),  Pollitt and 
Bouckaert,(2005), Hood (1991), Lan & Rosenbloom (1992), Osborne & Gaebler (1993), Bovens (2005a:1) 
through introducing new public management (NPM). More emphasize on accountability has been given later by 
various international aid providing agencies to ensure good governance by overcoming crisis of governance to 
efficient project implementation in developing countries (WB, 1990 and 1992; UNDP, 1997; IMF, 1997; ADB, 
1999; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Both the approaches- NPM and Governance focused on accountability, 
transparency, efficiency, effectiveness, and customer satisfaction by applying various market mechanisms and 
private sector management principles (Mollah, 2014:27). These principles are basically followed by two 
political-economic theories- public choice, and principal agent (Aucoin, 1990 and 2012; Dunsire, 1995; Lueder, 
1996; Reichard, 1996; Schedler, 1995; Osborne & Gaebler 1993; Reinermann, 1995). 
According to Stigler (1975:171 cited in Hughes, 2003), the key assumption of public choice theory is: 
‘A rational man must be guided by the incentive system within which he operates. No matter 
what his own personal desires, he must be discouraged from certain activities if they carry 
penalties and attracted toward others if they carry large rewards. The carrot and the stick 
guide scientists and politicians as well as donkeys”. 
Public choice theory discloses the fact that every person works for his/her self-interest, for instances, politicians 
do for vote collection to reach state power, and bureaucrats do for self- esteems and status, not for public interest 
(Hughes, 2003). Therefore, common peoples are depriving of their rights. To overcome this problem, the public 
choice theory offers market mechanisms to enhance the opportunities of alternative service options through 
better control and accountability. 
Similarly, the principal agent theory also focuses on private sector management principles. According 
to this theory, all the service providers are agents and services receivers are principals. Agents should carry out 
works to meet the will and expectations of principals (Hughes, 2003). This theory focuses on the 
“responsiveness of the agents decisions to the principal’s goals, and how this responsiveness is mediated by 
actions available to each actor as well as institutional settings in which they interact”(Gailmard, 2014:1).  
Principals have the capacity to judge the performance of their agents to ensure public accountability (Achen and 
Bartels 2002; Healy and Malhotra 2010; Lenz 2012; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; cited in Gailmard, 2014).  
In this paper, citizens are considered as principals, whereas; politicians (elected representatives) and 
public officials are considered as agents of delivering public services. However, in practice, citizens are treated 
as servant or agents or service providers are treated as principals. Therefore, citizens are depriving of getting 
their adequate services. To overcome this problem, this theory also offers market principles and privatizations 
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for better service delivery in a transparent and accountable manner.   
The common guiding principles of market mechanisms and private sector management are- customer 
care, citizen engagement, debureaucratization, performance and contract based jobs, decentralization, 
participatory budget making process, privatization, and outsourcing (Hood, 1989, 1991 and 1995; Pollitt, 1995; 
Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Hughes, 1998; Common, 1998; Minogue, 1998; Lan and Rosenbloom, 1992; Borins, 
1995).  How far these principles and theories are applied and implemented in Bangladesh have been examined 
based on empirical data (see annexes). 
This paper highlights on various types of accountability and its mechanisms in general, and emphasize 
has been given on social accountability particularly.   Social accountability is one of the important ways of 
engaging citizens in governance affairs for ensuring their rights in a transparent and accountable manner. 
Though, numerous mechanisms exist for ensuring social accountability, however, three components–citizen 
charters, participatory budget making process, and access to information, have been selected to evaluate the 
effectiveness of citizens’ role in ensuring accountability of public officials.  
The main aim of this study is to evaluate the current status of social accountability in the context of 
Bangladesh. To attain this objective, the following specific objectives have been analyzed: 
1. To know about general concept, types and mechanisms of accountability; 
2.  To know  the level of citizens awareness  and effectiveness of ensuring social accountability; 
3. To examine the selected mechanisms of social accountability in accounting public officials for getting 
services of citizens;  and 
4. To explore and evaluate the applicability of principal-agent relationships and opportunity of public 
choice in social accountability in the context of Bangladeshi governance. 
This is a case-oriented qualitative study, which is predominantly based on secondary sources of literature and 
few empirical data has been used to examine status of social accountability in Bangladesh. Empirical or primary 
data has been collected by interview, questionnaire survey (both open and close ended) and informal discussions. 
The Informal discussion has been effectively reflected for collecting more authentic data in this study.  The 
empirical data has been collected from the selected respondents of three public service organizations of Rajshahi 
City and one Union Parishad of Godagari Upazila in Rajshahi District (see annexes).1 Secondary data has been 
collected by documentary analysis and by internet browsing.  
The study would be helpful for academicians, researchers and readers in general for wider knowledge 
about various aspects of accountability. The findings of this study would be helpful for policy makers to take 
necessary steps for overcoming existing shortcomings of the social accountability in local governance (both 
urban and rural) in Bangladesh based on this case study (on Rajshahi district). 
 
2. Accountability: 
The word ‘accountability’ is originated from the Latin word ‘accomptare’ which is closely related to accounting 
and recognized as an Anglo-Norman concept (Bovens, 2005a:1). The roots of the concept of accountability can 
be traced back to the reign of William-I (Dubnick, 2002). However, gradually it has re-shaped to free from its 
original bondage of accounting and emerged as a strong emphasis on effective and transparent governance 
instead of bookkeeping (Bovens, 2005b). Thus, the paradigm shifts from financial accounting to public 
accountability through introduction of NPM (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2005). Therefore, accountability refers to the 
obligation on the part of public officials to report on the usage of public resources and answerability for failing to 
meet the targeted objectives.  
Accountability is considered as one of the core concepts of public administration because it constitutes 
the principle that informs the processes whereby those who hold and exercise public authority are held to 
account (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000). Accountability denotes the “methods, procedures, and forces by which 
administrative decisions are determined and influenced” (Simon, Smithburg and Thompson 1991; cited in Lynn 
and Carolyn, 2001). The similar definition given by Mulgan as ‘accountability is about calling and holding 
institutions and officials to account in undertaking their functions or duties’ (Mulgan,  2003:15 cited in Bovens, 
2005a).  In another opinion, accountability is a relationship between two individuals or parties, where, an 
individual is subject to another’s oversight and control to provide information or justification for their actions 
(Rick and Mitchell, n.d.).  
Therefore, the concept of accountability involves two distinct stages: answerability and enforcement. 
Answerability requires that an organization must do to satisfy its obligation and to answer for its actions. In other 
                                                          
1 Three service organizations are- Rajshahi Medical College Hospital, Rajshahi Railway Office, and Regional Passport office 
of Rajshahi. From these three organizations data have been collected about role of citizens’ charter and access to information 
regarding service delivery.  Besides, a Union Parishad has been selected for collecting data about participatory budget making 
process. Selected respondents and presentation of data with important questions has been displayed by annexes at the end of 
this paper. 
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words, answerability refers to the obligation of the government officials to provide information about their 
decisions and dealings and to give an explanation to the public and those organizations of accountability tasked 
with providing oversight. This obligation may be met simply by issuing an annual report or making a statement 
to a legislative committee and if the statement is complete and authentic then the obligation is discharged (Peters, 
n.d. cited in Pere and Osain, 2015). Conversely, enforcement refers to that public officials must be responsible 
for contravening behavior through application of sanctions. The ability of the overseeing actor(s) to impose 
punishment on the accountable actor(s) for failures and transgressions gives “teeth” to accountability 
(Brinkerhoff, 2001). Answerability without sanctions is generally considered as the weaker form of 
accountability. Though, most of the people like sanctions with requirements, standards, and penalties embodied 
in laws, statutes, and regulations but legal punishment are narrower than sanctions. They include, for example 
professional codes of conduct, an array of incentives that are intended to reward good behavior and action and 
discourage bad behavior and action without necessarily involving recourse to legal enforcement. Therefore, 
different organizations of accountability might be responsible for either or both of these stages (Bovens, 2005a). 
Thus, accountability is considered as the foundation of any administrative process and also a check on the power 
and authority exercised by both politicians and administrators (Dwivedi and Jabbra, 1988).  
Aucoin and Heintzman (2000) have identified three core objectives of accountability in a democratic 
polity. The first is to control the abuse and misuse of public authority. The second is to provide assurance in 
respect to the use of public resources and adherence to the law and public service values. The third is to 
encourage and promote learning in pursuit of continuous improvement in governance and public administration. 
The most concise description of accountability would be: ‘the obligation to explain and justify the conduct’. This 
‘implies a relationship between an actor and a forum’ (Pollitt 2003: 89). The relationship encompasses to provide 
information about the conduct of duties, questioning between forum and actor, and finally, judgment for 
sanctions or rewards (Bovens, 2005b). Thus,  accountability refers to as  ‘a relationship between an actor and a 
forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgment, and the actor can be sanctioned’ (Mark Bovens, 2005a; also cited in Brandsma, 
2013).  
Accountability then requires an actor with a duty to render an account and a second actor (forum) with 
the authorization to judge and, usually, impose sanctions. It implies that the actor explains and justifies his 
behavior and the forum has the right to demand information, the duty to pass judgment and the opportunity to 
sanction dissatisfactory conduct (Orbuch 1997: 455; Roberts 2001: 1551; Keohane 2002: 4; Dubnick 2005: 1; 
cited in Schillemans, 2007).  
The actor can be an individual, an organization, an official or civil servant or a public agency or an 
autonomous body. On the other hand, forum can be a specific person, such as a superior, a minister, or a 
journalist or it can be an agency, such as parliament, a court, or the audit office(Brandsma, 2013), but in the case 
of public accountability the general public is considered as the forum. The obligation that lies upon the actor can 
be formal or informal. Public officials often will be under a formal obligation to render account on a regular 
basis for specific forums, such as supervisory agencies, courts, or auditors. In the wake of administrative 
deviance, policy failures, or arbitrariness of public officials can be forced to appear in administrative or penal 
courts or to testify before parliamentary committees. 
From an analytical perspective, processes of accountability normally involve three phases or stages 
(Mulgan, 2003; Bovens 2005a; Schillemans, 2007). First, the information phase where an actor is obliged to 
inform the forum about his conduct, by providing various sorts of data about his/her jobs, the performance of 
tasks, outcomes, or about procedures. In the debating phase, actor and forum engage in a debate on this account. 
The forum has the right to interrogate the actor and to question the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy 
of the conduct. The actor will answer to questions and if necessary justify and defend his course of action. 
Finally, the judgement stage where the forum comes to a concluding judgment and decides whether and how to 
make use of available consequences like sanctions or rewards. This is also known as the sanctions or 
consequence phase. Sanctions may vary from formal disapproval to tighten regulations, fines, discharge of 
management or even the termination of the organization.  
 Based on the above discussion, attempts have been made to conceptualize the meaning of 
accountability in the context of the study. It can be said, though there is no generally accepted definition; the six 
elements of accountability can be distinguished: i. there is an event that triggers the accountability process, ii. a 
person or organization that is accountable, iii. an action or situation for which the person or organization is 
accountable, iv. a forum to which the person or organization is accountable,  v. there are criteria to judge the 
action or situation, and vi. if necessary, there are sanctions which can be imposed on the person or organization. 
In this study, public official is treated as an actor or agent and citizen is the forum or principal. Here, 
public officials are obliged to answer their action’s legality or validity  to the citizen and based on the query or 
review process the citizen discharge judgments with possible consequences or sanctions. Above and beyond, for 
better understanding of the concept ‘accountability’ it is necessary to analyze the typologies of accountability 
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first. 
 
3. Typologies of Accountability and Its Mechanisms: 
Accountability in general classified by vertical and horizontal but in practice it incorporates several typology, 
dimensions or components, which are further inexorably intertwined and independent. It is really an assiduous 
task to segregate this concept and operationalize it in the right manner (Rahman, 2000).  Yet questions are often 
raised regarding accountability, for example, ‘accountability to whom?’ accountability for what? And 
‘accountability through which mechanisms’? Keeping it in mind the various types of accountability and its 
mechanisms are discussed below.  
 
3.1 Vertical Accountability and Horizontal Accountability:  
During the 1990s, Guillermo O’Donnell brought the conceptual framework of vertical and horizontal 
accountability to contemporary debates about democracy. According to O’Donnell, accountability runs not only 
vertically, making elected officials answerable to the ballot box, but also horizontally, across a network of 
relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other institutions) that can call into question, and eventually punish, 
improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of a given office (O'Donnell, 1999). Theorists refer to this 
important distinction as “vertical” accountability (by the State to the citizens) versus “horizontal” accountability 
(by the State to its own public institutions of accountability). 
Where there is a classic top-down, principal agent relationship, whereby the principal delegates to the 
agent, the agent is accountable to their direct superiors in the chain-of-command and this constitutes a form of 
vertical accountability. For instance the public official answers to the department/ agency minister, the 
department answers to the minister, the minister answers to parliament (in particular in parliamentary systems), 
and parliament answers to citizens. Parliament, as principal, requires the government and its officials, as agents, 
to implement the laws, policies and programs it has approved and holds the government and officials to account 
for their performance in this regard. Parliament is also an agent, in that the electorate (the principal) elects 
legislators to enact laws and oversee government actions on their behalf. The electorate then holds legislators to 
account at election time and, in a few jurisdictions, through recall, where dissatisfied voters can recall their 
elected representative and vote for an alternative.  
On the other hand, horizontal accountability is the capacity of state institutions to check abuses by 
other public agencies and branches of government, or the requirement for agencies to report sideways. Numerous 
scholars have recently referred to horizontal accountability (Day and Klein, 1987: 28; Sinclair, 1995: 223; Scott 
2000: 42; Goetz and Jenkins, 2001: 363; Keohane, 2002: 22; Mulgan, 2003: 26; Bovens, 1998 and 2005a). The 
concept is most strongly linked with the study of O’Donnell (1999 and 2003; Kenney, 2003; Schillemans, 2008). 
According to O’Donnell, horizontal accountability is the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and 
empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions 
or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified 
as unlawful (O’Donnell, 1999). These state agencies comprise the classic separation of powers, but also include 
a variety of oversight entities, such as audit offices, ombudsmen, courts of accounts, electoral commissions, 
judiciary, anti-corruption body, human rights commission and so on. Three aspects of horizontal accountability 
are hereby specified: who exercises horizontal accountability (state agencies), what the exercise of horizontal 
accountability consists of (oversight, sanctions, impeachment), and with respect to what actions or omissions 
horizontal accountability may be exercised (those qualified as unlawful). Vertical accountability is exercised by 
societal actors with respect to state actors, and horizontal accountability is exercised within the state by different 
state agencies.  
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Table 0-1  
Vertical vs Horizontal Accountability with Illustrative Examples 
Sanctions/enforcement Mechanisms of Horizontal 
Accountability  
 
Mechanisms of  Vertical Accountability 
(outsider) 
High 
enforcement/sanctions 
Capacity 
· Supreme audit institutions 
· Courts 
· Comptrollers general 
· Law enforcement agencies 
· Parliamentary hearings 
· Legislative committees 
· Administrative review councils 
· Anti-corruption agencies 
· Elections 
· Professional codes of conduct 
· National/international standard-
setting bodies 
· Accreditation agencies 
· Referenda 
· Public interest law 
Low 
enforcement/sanctions 
Capacity 
· Advisory boards 
· Interministerial committees 
· Ombudsman offices 
· Blue ribbon panels 
· Citizens’ charters 
· Freedom of information laws 
· Citizen oversight committees 
· Service delivery surveys 
· Civil society watchdog 
organizations 
· Policy research (e.g., by 
think tanks or universities) 
· Investigative journalism (media) 
Source: Derick W. Brinkerhoff (2001), Taking Account of Accountability: A Conceptual Overview and 
Strategic Options, studied by U.S. Agency for International Development, Center for Democracy and 
Governance, Implementing Policy Change Project, Phase 2, Washington, DC. March 2001. 
 
3.2 Constitutional/Political Accountability 
In democratic societies, there is a constitutional obligation that both the political leaders (ministers) and 
professional executives (civil servants) will be accountable to the parliament for the execution of public policies, 
programs and activities. The constitution of most of the democratic countries like Bangladesh provides for a 
system of ensuring that ministers are accountable to the parliament for their actions (along with those of their 
subordinates). This type of accountability is exercised along the chain of principal-agent relationships (Strom, 
2000). Electorates delegate their sovereignty to popular representatives, who in turn, at least in parliamentary 
democracies, delegate the majority of their authorities to a cabinet of ministers. This type of accountability is 
also sometimes known as ministerial responsibility. In parliamentary systems with ministerial accountability, 
such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany, public servants and their organizations are 
accountable to their minister, who must render political account to parliament (Flinders, 2001; Boven, 2005). As 
the representative of peoples, minister’s act, as the political heads of the government offices are accountable to 
the parliament. The key relationship under political accountability resembles that between a representative and 
his/her constituent (Romzek, 1998). Periodic election featuring limited terms of office appears as the principal 
weapon in the hand of citizens to ensure political accountability and render the basis of legitimacy to govern. 
Political accountability is the accountability of the government, civil servant and politicians to the public and to 
legislature. In parliamentary systems, the government relies on the support of parliament, which gives parliament 
power to hold the government to account. For example, some parliaments can pass a vote of no confidence in the 
government. According to Jabbra and Dwivedi (1998), political leadership has a constitutional duty to account to 
the parliament and in addition, to expect the accountability of public servants by dint of political accountability. 
Political accountability is realized by making political leaders responsive to pressures laid upon them by MPs, 
pressure groups, local political action groups and consumer interest groups (Younis and Mostafa, 2000). To 
ensure political accountability there are some other instruments which include parliamentary questions, debates 
and reviews, parliamentary committees, the vote of no confidence, budget appropriations, interest groups, 
business organizations, electronic media, civil societies and political parties. 
 
3.3  Administrative Accountability 
The administrative accountability system involves two simple ingredients: an organized and legitimate 
relationship between a superior and a subordinate in which need to follow ‘orders’ is unquestioned; and close 
supervision or a surrogate system of standard operating procedures or clearly stated rules and regulation 
(Romzek and Dubnik, 1987). Internal rules and norms as well as some independent commission are mechanisms 
to hold civil servant within the administration of government accountable. Within a department or ministry, 
firstly, behavior is bounded by rules and regulations; secondly, civil servants are subordinates in a hierarchy and 
accountable to superiors.  Administrative accountability is a key factor in ensuring an effective check on the 
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power and authority exercised by the administrators. Smith notes:  
“Administrators have great power in most societies by way of their expertise, permanence, size 
of their organizations and their close proximity to political power. Administrators also 
implement policies and are often in a position whereby they can exercise considerable 
discretion in policy application” (Smith, 1991: 95). 
Administrative accountability is a mechanism that ensures rules, regulations and instructions, supervisions, 
hierarchy, etc., by which public officials act and by which they are also required to account for their actions 
(Jabbra and Dwivedi, 1988: 5). Simon et al, use the term accountability as a responsive legislative body, acting 
largely through politically responsive committees (Simon, et al. 1991). They argue that this accountability will 
become effective when the Chief Executive is elected by the people and is held accountable to them.  
Certain mechanisms (both internal and external) exist under this type of accountability such as 
(internal) the hierarchical, evaluation of performance, rules, regulations, supervision, inspections, codes of 
conduct, and (external) judicial reviews of administrative actions, ombudsman, legislative reviews, review 
tribunals etc. External mechanisms are sometimes called legal accountability, which consists of two crucial 
subcategories i.e. accountability through judiciary and accountability through parliament and its institutions. In 
this research, administrative accountability is used to mean answerability and legality of every action, power and 
authority exercised by an administrative authority, which can be checked by citizens. 
 
3.4 Legal Accountability 
The term ‘legal accountability’ refers to judicial process through which actions and the decisions of government 
officials can be placed under judicial review and are then open to inspection and liable to challenge in the courts, 
usually on the grounds that certain officials have acted without legal power, or have exceeded their powers 
(Younis and Mostafa, 2000). The objectives of judicial accountability are to ensure high standards of decision-
making and public acceptance of judicial decisions (Murray, 1994; cited in Akkas, 2004). In most western 
countries, legal accountability is of increasing importance to public institutions as a result of the growing 
formalization of social relations or because of the greater trust which is placed on the courts than in parliaments 
that can be the ‘ordinary’ civil courts, as in Britain, or also specialized administrative courts, as in France, 
Belgium, and The Netherlands (Boven, 2005). In the UK, the meaning of judicial accountability is answerability 
to the law courts for the lawfulness action (Wade and Forsyth, 1982). The role of judges within the system is to 
advance principles to guide administrative procedures, and to judge their legality. As Feldman asserts, the role of 
the judges is to uphold the Rule of Law and Parliamentary Supremacy, by ensuring that officials do not exceed 
or abuse the powers given by Parliament (Younis and Mostafa, 2000).  In the context of USA, Simon et al (1991) 
has identified three basic levels of judicial accountability. These are: 
· An action based on the statute or order may be challenged in the law courts because the statute or order 
is claimed to violate the constitution. 
· Any given action or class of actions can be reviewed by the courts who in fact determine their 
lawfulness (or otherwise). Judges of regular courts of law test authority delegated to administrative 
agencies, in order to determine whether it is legal or illegal, valid or invalid. ‘No law can authorize what 
the courts regard as arbitrary action’. 
· An officer can be held personally accountable for his actions if he acts outside the scope of the law and 
powers. Therefore, actions taken by officers must be within the purview of law, or the courts can 
penalize them (Simon et al, 1991). 
Effective judicial review is one of the most important mechanisms for ensuring judicial accountability on the 
part of judicial officers. Strong personal ethics may also serve to guide judicial officers towards giving correct 
judgments. In this study legal or judicial accountability refers to include all public/government officials. 
 
3.5 Managerial Accountability 
Managerial accountability is a technical process, which refers to the answerability of officials regarding carrying 
out of agreed tasks according to agreed performance standards. Managerial accountability consists of three 
dimensions: fiscal accountability, process accountability and program accountability (Stewart, 1984). These three 
dimensions can respectively be called regularity, efficiency and effectiveness of the audit.  
Fiscal accountability refers to the answerability of officials in ensuring that money has been spent in 
accordance with prescribed rules. Legal accountability can also be seen to occur in this area. The role of the 
parliament is to ensure that public money is not being wasted, and to this end it has been authorized to prevent 
fraud and misappropriation.  
Process accountability revolves around ensuring that the goals of a given course of action have been 
achieved using the minimum amount of resources, i.e. money, certain things should be ensured and there should 
be an incentive in public budgeting to save public money (Younis and Mostafa, 2000). In this way, the 
government decision-making process should be improved and public expenditure can be controlled.  
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On the other hand program accountability involves ensuring that the performance of any given course of action 
has achieved its purpose or goal. Auditing program monitoring, personnel management and budgets are the 
principal mechanisms for ensuring managerial accountability. 
 
3.6 Professional Accountability 
Professional accountability refers to professional standards by which the performance of duties can be measured 
(Jabbra and Dwivedi, 1988). This type of accountability refers to the high professionals in all walks of life. 
Professional accountability demands that professionals in the public service should balance the code or norms of 
their profession with the broader context of safeguarding the public interest. Like the civil service employs 
professional people (such as lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers, accountants) who will be accountable to 
standard professional for behaviour established by professional associations. This type of accountability may 
imply accountability relationships with professional associations and disciplinary tribunals which lay down 
codes with standards for acceptable practice that are binding for all members (Boven, 2005). The relationships of 
this type of accountability will be particularly relevant for public managers who work in professional public 
organizations, such as hospitals, schools, universities, research institutes, police departments, public officials of 
agricultural or engineering departments and like those. It is characterized by placement of control over 
organizational activities in the hands of the employee with the expertise or special skills to get the job done 
(Romzek and Dubnik, 1987). Professional accountability can be ensured through having effective, dedicated and 
committed professional groups, with professional itself being an effective mechanism. It includes professional 
code of ethics to guide members of the profession, codes that are often enforced by formal means. Many 
professions have secured legal power to practice their skills, and professional codes of conduct can prevent the 
misuse of this power. However, professionals can also be held accountable indirectly through effective 
parliamentary questioning, committee system and by the press (Mostafa and Younis, 2000). Again, citizen group 
can play a very effective role in alerting public opinion against the misuse of clinical and other freedoms. 
 
3.7 Quasi-Judicial Accountability 
There are certain limitations to judicial accountability because judicial process is costly, though administrative 
tribunals have been initiated in some countries to reduce the cost. This is one example of quasi- judicial 
accountability. The administrative system in a department is quasi–judicial in terms of working procedures, 
structures and objectives (Keeling, 1972). Quasi-judicial accountability involves the formulation of codes, 
departmental rules, guidelines and instructions to control the discretion of officials. Administrative tribunals are 
set up for review, and they also exist to provide precedents in order to guide interpretation of the law and the 
exercise of the discretion. Review tribunals, therefore, can make this type of accountability, effective (Smith, 
1980).  
 
3.8 Financial Accountability 
Financial accountability refers to tracking and reporting on allocation, disbursement, and utilization of financial 
resources, using the tools of auditing, budgeting, and accounting (Jabbra and Dwivedi, 1988). Financial 
accountability deals with compliance with laws, rules, and regulations regarding financial control and 
management.  Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Planning exercise oversight and control functions regarding 
line ministries and other executing agencies as part of executive branch. Besides, many executing agencies 
contract with the private sector or with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), these oversight and control 
functions extend to cover public procurement and contracting. Legislatures pass the budget law that becomes the 
basis for executive agency spending targets, for which they are held accountable. 
Obviously, a critical issue for the viable, functioning of financial accountability is the institutional 
capacity of the various public and private entities involved. If internal audit departments are unable to track 
funds, if executive agencies cannot report on their budgets and expenditures, and if external review bodies do not 
have the technical capacity or the resources to conduct financial reviews, then financial accountability is 
weakened. Another issue has to do with linking the use of financial resources to the achievement of results. 
Some systems are structured on the assumption that proper procedure is a sufficient proxy for appropriate use of 
resources to generate desired outcomes (Brinkerhoff, 2001). This is where financial accountability needs to 
connect to performance accountability. Increasingly, national audit institutions in industrialized countries have 
expanded their scope to include questions of performance (PUMA, 1996). A related issue is the planned versus 
actual allocation of financial resources to executive agencies. 
If agencies fail to receive allocations in a timely manner and if what is received constitutes only a 
small proportion of planned budgetary envelopes, then it can be difficult to talk meaningfully about 
accountability that links financing to performance. 
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3.9 Performance Accountability 
Performance accountability refers to demonstrating and accountable for performance in light of agreed-upon 
performance targets. Sometimes termed managerial accountability, its focus is on the services, outputs, and 
results of public agencies and programs (Brinkerhoff, 2001). This is linked to financial accountability in that the 
financial resources to be accounted for are intended to produce goods, services, and benefits for citizens, but it is 
distinct in that financial accountability’s emphasis concentrating on legal procedural compliance whereas 
performance accountability on results. It is connected to democratic/political accountability in that among the 
criteria for performances are responsiveness to citizens and achievement of service delivery targets that meet 
their needs and demands. 
On the surface, performance accountability appears deceptively simple: public officials should be 
accountable for the outputs, results, and impacts. However, a number of methodological issues arise in thinking 
about performance accountability and governance reform. One has to do with the setting of performance targets 
and their measurement (Cook et al., 1995). As both analysts and practitioners have noted, these tasks are easier 
for service delivery agencies than for organizations whose outputs are policy-related and less tangible. It is also 
easier for service users to assess performance directly and to hold agencies accountable when the service 
provided is straightforward and concrete. Another issue has to do with shared accountability and attribution of 
responsibility for outcomes. For activities that cut across several government departments or involve public-
private partnerships, how to determine who has done what, and thus, to ensure accountability is often unclear 
(PUMA, 1999). 
 
3.10  Consultative Accountability  
In recent years, there has been an increasing need for consultative accountability. Departments or ministers need 
to consult with interested parties, citizens, business organizations and other interest groups in the formulation of 
public policies (Younis and Mostafa, 2000). Consultative groups, boards or committees provide advisory 
services to the departments and work for the parent department’s benefit by exerting a measure of control over 
their sources of information. Obligation to the department or ministries concerned is an important mechanism in 
rendering this accountability effectively. Advisory committees, boards and consultative groups must accept that 
obligation (Younis and Mostafa, 2000). Pressure from interest groups can be another mechanism, but these 
groups also have to be committed to assisting the departments or ministries by offering constructive criticisms 
and problems.  
 
3.11  Social Accountability 
Social accountability is an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, namely a 
situation whereby ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations participate directly or indirectly in exacting 
accountability. Such accountability is sometimes referred to it as society driven horizontal accountability. The 
term social accountability is, in a sense, a misnomer since it is not meant to refer to a specific type of 
accountability, but rather to a particular approach (or set of mechanisms) for ensuring accountability. The logic 
behind this type of accountability is in many western democracies for more direct and explicit accountability 
relations between public agencies on the one hand and clients, citizens and civil society on the other hand 
(McCandless, 2001). Mechanisms of social accountability can be initiated and supported by the state, citizens or 
both, but very often they are demand-driven and operate from the bottom-up. It is generally accepted that social 
accountability mechanisms are an example of vertical accountability. Boven (2005) also mentioned that agencies 
or individual public managers should feel obliged to account for their performance to the public at large or at 
least, to civil interest groups, charities, and associations of clients.  However, a minority of commentators argues 
that, with respect to social accountability, a hierarchical relationship is generally lacking between actor and 
forum, as are any formal obligations to render account. Giving account to various stakeholders occurs basically 
on a voluntary basis with no intervention on the part of the principal. Therefore, social accountability would be a 
form of horizontal accountability. Recently, the tendency of increasing for the results of inspections, assessments 
and benchmarks is put on the internet. For example, in The Netherlands, as in the, the National Board of School 
Inspectors makes its inspection reports on individual schools widely available on the internet UK (Pollitt, 2003; 
Boven, 2005). Parents, journalists, and local councils easily can compare the results of a particular school with 
similar schools in the region, because quantitative and comparative benchmarks are provided for, but they also 
have access to the quite extensive qualitative reports (Boven, 2005). Besides, social accountability initiatives are 
as varied and different as participatory budgeting, administrative procedures acts, social audits, and citizen report 
cards which all involve citizens in the oversight and control of government. This can be contrasted with 
government initiatives or entities, such as citizen advisory boards, which fulfill public functions. 
 
3.12 Moral Accountability 
Moral accountability refers to a moral sense (of feeling) that aids the loyalty of public officials in matters of 
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public interests, and makes them act in a responsible manner (Jabbra and Dwivedi, 1998). A personal ethic is an 
important mechanism in making this type of accountability effective. There exist many other forms of 
accountability, such as decentralized accountability, public corporation accountability, procedural accountability, 
financial accountability, etc. 
Several conclusions can be reached from reviewing the various meanings of accountability. First, 
accountability refers to the relationship among citizens, public policy, political leadership and public officials. 
Second, it is a settled language of discourse about conduct and performance, and the criterion that should be used 
in appraising them. Third, it concerns answerability, responsiveness, perceptions and power, and openness. 
Fourth, it is concerned with the concept of legality, responsibility and sanctions. Fifth, it involves cost, 
dedication, loyalty and high professional and moral/ethical standards. Sixth, it involves a number of interrelated 
internal controls and performance evaluation attributes.  
The question of how accountability can be ensured is closely linked with the matter of channels, or 
mechanisms of accountability. It is important to be aware of the channel through which mechanisms can be 
secured. The following table 2 shows the types of mechanisms of accountability and its degree of control. This 
table highlights the fact that a diverse range of mechanisms operates at different points in the system. Some of 
these mechanisms relate primarily to politicians; some are focused on the need to secure the accountability of 
officials to their administrative superiors. The table serves to illustrate who is accountable to whom and what is 
the nature of the mechanisms and degree of control. It also serves as a guide to the behavior of politician and 
civil servants, since the mechanisms themselves outline of expected behavior. The table shows that the 
mechanisms include system of performance that identifies objective rather than subjective criteria, against which 
individual and organizational performance can be judged. As, mentioned above mechanisms also include the role 
of political parties, pressure groups, freedom of information and the media in promoting government 
accountability. 
Table-2  
Mechanisms of Accountability 
Internal External 
Degree of 
Control 
Formal:  
Tight 
Hierarchy Legislative Review 
Rules/Regulations Advisory Committees 
Budgets Judicial Review 
Personnel Management Ombudsman 
Performance Evaluation Review Tribunal 
Auditing Program Monitoring Evaluation Research 
Code of Conduct Freedom of information 
Informal:   
Personal Ethics Public Comment 
Loose 
Professionalisms Interest Group Pressure 
Representative Bureaucracy Peer Review 
Commitment Media Scrutiny 
Anticipated Reactions from 
Superior 
Political Parties 
N/A Politician and Official at other levels of 
Government 
Note: Adopted from Younis and Mostafa (2000:35) and Romzek and Dubnik (1987, 229). 
From the foregoing discussion, various types of accountability and its mechanisms has been found. In 
the context of the present study, emphasis has been given on the social accountability of government officials 
that is ensured through the citizen engagement as a horizontal and external mechanism.  
 
4. How far Social Accountability is Ensuring in Bangladesh: 
Social accountability is a process of building relationships between citizens and government institutions through 
citizen participation and civic engagement (PRIA, 2013).  This is an option of creating opportunities and spaces 
for the citizens to participate in government activities in ensuring accountability of public officials. According to 
WB’s (2006) social accountability source book- 
   “Social accountability is about affirming and operationalizing direct accountability 
relationships between citizens, the state and service providers. Social accountability refers to  
the broad range of actions and mechanisms (beyond voting) that citizens can use to hold the 
public officials to account, as well as, actions on the part of government, civil society, media 
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and other societal actors that promote or facilitate these efforts”. 
Therefore, social accountability depends on the ability of citizens to hold the government institutions 
accountable and increase the effectiveness of their programs through a broad range of actions. These actions help 
the governance institutions and citizens to recognize their mutual responsibility in promoting governance. The 
actions and mechanisms of social accountability are used in various types throughout the world like citizen 
charter, participatory budget process, citizen report card, ward Shaba (meeting), monitoring group of citizens, 
access to information, study circles,  deliberative polling, consensus conferences, public hearings, citizens’ juries, 
CSO oversight committees, local oversight committees, ombudsman etc. (WB, 2006). However, for the present 
study three basic mechanisms have been tested to evaluate the social accountability and its impact on service 
delivery and governance. These three mechanisms are: citizen charter, access to information and information 
service center, and participatory budget making process. 
 
4.1 Citizen Charter 
It is one of the vital tools of social accountability, which is used widely by the public service sector to inform the 
citizens about details of their services. A Citizens’ Charter is the expression of an understanding between the 
citizen and the public service provider about the quantity and quality of services citizens receive in exchange for 
their taxes. The Citizen’s Charter is a written, voluntary declaration by service providers about service standards, 
choice, accessibility, non-discrimination, transparency and accountability. Therefore, it is a useful way of 
defining for the customers, the nature of service provision and explicit standards of service delivery. In this paper, 
the author used some field data (see Annex-1)  about the health service, railway services, and passport services 
of Rajshahi City. Through analyzing field data, it has been found that selected three organizations (mentioned in 
footnote) are well equipped by technology, IT service, staffs, doctors and citizen charters. However, medical 
college hospital has not adequate infrastructure compared to patients, like, beds, Operation Theaters (OTS) and 
words. Therefore, patients are suffering from lack of beds and Operation Theater (OT) services.  
In railway office at Rajshahi, service delivery is easier and quicker than previous years. Citizens are 
very happy and they do not face any hazards for collecting tickets or any other services in Rajshahi. Conversely, 
services of passport office are not friendly like railway. Most of the service receivers are annoyed and frustrated 
to the officials of this office. To get a passport is very hazardous and the staffs are not cooperative enough. They 
act as principal instead of agents.  
Thought citizen charter displayed in front of the selected offices, however, most of the service 
receivers have not adequate knowledge about citizen charter and services, and they have not enough knowledge 
about their rights and services especially for services. Therefore, they have no voice for receiving service-
adequately, timely, and properly. One the other hand, service providers are almost aware about this, but they are 
less careful to provide services transparently and promptly. They act like the principal instead of the agent. 
Therefore, citizens’ charter is showing just like a calendar on the wall instead of an instrument of social 
accountability. Thus, the aim of citizen engagement in public service through citizens’ charter is not ensured in 
health, passport, and railway services in Rajshahi city as well urban governance in Bangladesh.  
Lack of consciousness of citizens and inadequate publicity about citizen charter are the main reasons 
of failure to ensure social accountability and better service delivery in the selected areas, which has identified by 
the field data (see annex-1).  
 
4.2 Participatory Budget Making Process 
This is another important weapon of engaging citizen in policy issues and development of a country as well as 
ensuring social accountability of government. Recently a study has been conducted by TIB on participatory 
budget making process and found that- 
“Participation of the beneficiaries of development efforts as stakeholders make the budget 
more appropriate, transparent, accountable and effective. Participatory and open budget, 
budget tracking and monitoring with the participation of the service recipients are key 
elements in the build up as well as follow-up on the IP” (TIB, 2012). 
Similarly, the UNDP has an empirical study on ‘open budget’ in Bangladesh which has been conducted for 
2013-14 financial pre budget discussion with common people in an Upazila. In this study, the joint secretary of 
Upazila as a focal person expressed his opinion that - 
"we could not prepare the budget from 2009 to 2011 as UZP functionaries had no knowledge 
or training how to prepare it. Now, after getting the training provided by the UNDP, the UZPs 
are much more capable and confident in preparing the budget"(UNDP, 2014).  
In another empirical study, on “Participatory Budgeting in Bangladesh Local Government Context” conducted 
by four scholars (Hossain et al., 2014) in the Nabigonj Municipality of Habigonj in Bangladesh. The findings of 
this study is different from previous two studies as given below- 
“level of scope of participations was very low in this area, but the majority (55.3%) of people 
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were highly positive about the initiation to (Participatory Budgeting) PB. This study also 
reveals that understanding of participatory budgeting as a concept that leads to improve 
governance is still very limited and Citizens were incapable of contributing productively to 
policy-making within the Nabigonj Municipality” (Hossain et al., 2014:28). 
The author has a study on participation of Ward Shava (See annex-2) of Gogram Union Parishad of Godagari 
Upazila in Rajshahi district and found most of the cases opinions are accepted from the upper class participants 
and nominated by ruling political party. Besides, in decision making including budget discussion, poor, 
marginalized and women are skipped because of the domination of rich and politically selected people. Another 
interesting finding of this study was, most of the respondents have not enough knowledge on Ward Shava and 
budget. 
Though, the participatory budget making process is an effective mechanism of inclusive governance 
and social accountability, however, lack of enough ideas and knowledge of common people about this, 
participation is very poor. Apart from this, it is a very prospective instrument to ensure social accountability and 
inclusive governance in Bangladesh but need more publicity among citizens to ensure their meaningful 
participation. 
 
4.3 Access to Information and Information Service Centre 
The government of Bangladesh has passed Right to Information (RTI) Act in 2009 to ensure accountability of 
public agencies and subsequently an information commission was established to provide necessary information 
to the citizens (Hasanuzzaman, 2012; Mollah, 2014: 36).  Besides, the government has already established Union 
Information  Services Centers (UISC) as a one-stop service at all 4,547 Union Parishads (UP, at the lowest tier of 
local government) of the country (Connecttask, 2014). The aim of UISC is to provide various types of 
information related to government, livelihood and private services to the citizens in rural areas run by local 
entrepreneurs, hosted by UPs and supported by central administration (Connecttask, 2014). The study of 
Connecttask (2014) also explored that 45 Million citizen got services from UISC in the last 2 years countrywide 
for instance, 40 Million got services for birth registration (Connecttask, 2014). 
However, in the context of social accountability, though, five years have been passed  after passing the 
Act of RTI, no substantial progress in practice, the current state of human rights, democracy, abuse of executive 
and political power and corruption are still continuing (Mollah, 2014:36). Most of the cases, citizens are less 
conscious and officials are not very friendly to cooperate the service receivers.  
The author’s field data raveled that most of the officials are aware about access to information but less 
care to provide information to the citizens. The staffs of railway office of Rajshahi are friendly comparing to 
other two organizations regarding cooperation and service delivery to citizens. Besides, citizens are not 
conscious enough to right to information and have not bargaining power with officials. However, both citizens 
and officials recognize that this can be an effective mechanism of ensuring social accountability and citizen 
rights (see annex-1). 
Practical case story: recently (April-May, 2015), the author himself as a service receiver and observer 
visited several times (7 times) at the Divisional Passport Office, Rajshahi for his three family members' passports 
and his own, but the official is very careless to provide appropriate information at a time to fill up the application 
form. As a result common people are suffering a lot and several times citizens have to do the same jobs. The 
author talked (informal discussion) with around 20 people who came to this office for making passport and 
found the fact that none of them did complete and collect their passport without any hazards. The author directly 
talked with the head of this office (Assistant Director) regarding this, but he/she just instructs his/her 
subordinates and subordinate manipulate service receivers in various ways. Apart from this, some people found 
in this office who desired to help people by exchange of money recognized as a broker who has a hidden link 
with officials.  
Therefore, access to information as a mean of social accountability is very ineffective to get proper 
information and services from public offices for example passport office in Rajshahi. In contrast, service centers 
of local government are very useful and helpful for collecting information, but most of the people are not aware 
and informed about this.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper was to evaluate the status of social accountability in Bangladesh based on field 
data y the case studies of three service organizations of Rajshahi city and a Union Parishad of Godagari Upazila 
in Rajshahi District.  Before doing that, a theoretical analysis has been done for better understanding of the 
concept and trivia of accountability. From the foregoing discussion and analysis of theoretical and empirical 
information, and with practical experience, observation, and perception of this paper, the readers and researchers 
in the field of accountability and governance would find ideas, and knowledge about various interesting types of 
accountability and its ensuring mechanisms.  Besides, to attain the main objective, few specific objectives have 
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been analyzed. And for doing that, an attempt has been made for an in-depth empirical study on social 
accountability based on field data. From analysis it has been found that social accountability is a means by which, 
both people and administration have a chance to share opinions and work together. In empirical section, the 
author has used three vital components of social accountability–citizen charter, participatory budget making 
process, and access to information. The major findings of this paper are these three components of social 
accountability are very effective for accountable, transparent, and participatory governance that has been 
recognized by officials and citizens however, in Bangladesh the practice of these components is not very 
effective and satisfactory.  
In introduction, it has been disclosed that recent concept of accountability has been developed by 
influencing two political and economic theories public choice, and principal-agent theories. According to those 
theories, every person is guided by self interests not for public interest. In addition, citizen should be treated as 
principal and official as agents will works for meet the expectation of citizens. In practice, we found that official 
are working for their own willingness and like as principals instead of agents.  Therefore, to overcome those 
limitations more market principles should be introduced which have been prescribed by these two theories in 
above. 
The major causes of ineffectiveness are less consciousness and the absence of the voice of the people. 
Apart from this, the officials are not friendly, less cooperative and elitist in character. To overcome this problem 
and shortcoming, more campaign and conscious building program should be undertaken by government with 
NGOs and voluntary organizations to aware the common people. Motivational training program should be 
introduced for government officials to change their elitist character and behavior for citizen friendly services. 
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Annexure: 
Annex-1: –Role CC and Access to information in service delivery and social accountability 
Respondents Accountab
ility 
Mechanis
ms 
Health Services(HS) at RMCH 
 
 
 
 
25 officials 
(10 doctors+10 
nurses+ 
5 ward boys) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CC  
and  
AI 
Do you know 
about CC of 
HS? 
Why CC and AI? Do you follow 
CC rules? 
Govt. services 
available for citizens? 
Wards and 
beds 
adequate? 
OT and IT facilities 
and services of 
D+N available? 
Service center? 
Do you think 
CC and AI is 
one of the 
mechanisms 
citizens’ 
engagements? 
Do you think 
CC and AI is 
one of the 
mechanisms of 
accountability? 
D+
N  
WB D+N WB  
D+
N 
WB D+N WB D+
N  
W
B 
D+N W
B 
D+N W
B 
D+
N 
WB 
Yes Not 
clear 
to us 
To 
inform 
about 
the 
service
s to the 
citizens
) 
Un 
known 
 
So
me
tim
es 
Never Yes but 
not 
adequat
e 
Yes 
not 
adequate 
no no Yes but 
not 
satisfactor
y 
yes yes yes yes yes 
50 service 
receivers(patients 
and their 
guardians) 
 
Heard about it 
but don’t know 
what does it 
mean 
Unknown Unknown Yes, but  not adequate No Limited Yes Yes but not 
effective in 
practice 
       
Heard but have 
not adequate 
idea 
Perhaps for service 
information 
Just saw in 
front of the 
hospital but 
never quire 
about this 
Yes, but  not adequate No Limited Yes unknown 
 
25 others  
(Surrounding 
people of 
Hospital) 
Total= 100         
 
Respondents 
 
CC 
and 
AI 
Rajshahi Rail Way Office   
 Do you know 
about CC of 
RS? 
Why CC and AI? Do you follow 
CC rules? 
Govt. services 
available for citizens? 
Is IT facilities and services of Officials 
adequate? 
Do you think CC and AI is an 
effective mechanism of ensuring 
social accountability? 
10 officials Yes For providing service 
information to the citizens 
not practice Yes Yes, online ticket and information 
available. 
Yes but no one can quire us 
regarding this 
50 service 
receivers  
20%=10 
respondents 
knows about cc 
but have not 
adequate 
knowledge. 
Rests of the 
respondents 
have no idea. 
May be service 
information 
No Yes Yes, service providers are 
cooperatives but there is no separate 
service line for women and autistics to 
collect first class ticket. 
Yes, but never we bargaining for any 
service facilities. 
Total 60        
Respondents  
 
 
CC 
 
And 
AI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional Passport Office Rajshahi 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you know 
about CC of 
PS? 
 
 
 
Why CC and AI? 
 
 
 
Do you follow 
CC rules? 
 
 
Available for citizens? 
 
 
 
Is IT facilities and services of officials 
adequate? 
 
 
 
Do you think CC and AI  is an 
effective mechanism of ensuring 
social accountability? 
10 officials 
 
 
Yes Service information and 
facilities 
No Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes, but never practice here. 
25 service 
receivers 
 
15 respondents 
know about 
this but 
unknown to 10 
respondents. 
 
15 respondents  
 
know about it. 
 
Information about rule 
regulations of issuing 
passports  
No Yes  
Facilities available but service 
delivery is very hazardous, irritating 
and less cooperative. 
 
 
 
Yes, however we have no bargaining 
power 
 
 
Total=35        
Grand Total=195 Grand total 
officials=4
5 
Grand total 
service 
receivers=150 
     
 
Note: This chart is compiled by number of tables initially made by field data. Since, the space of an article is limited; therefore, I made the chart concisely.  Data has been collected by author with three graduate students in 
July-October 2014. 
 
Here,  
AI= Access to information, CC= Citizen Charter, HS=health Services,  RS= Railway Services, PS= Passport 
Services, UP= Union Parishad. 
RMCH= Rajshahi Medical College Hospital. 
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Annex-2:  Role participatory Budget making process by Ward Shava in ensuring Social accountability 
and Governance in GOgram Union  
Respondents Do you 
know about 
Ward 
Shava? 
Do you 
know 
about 
Budget? 
Did your 
opinion 
Accept in 
Shava? 
Do you think it is 
helpful for 
ensuring citizen 
rights? 
Do you think it is an 
effective mechanism 
of Social 
accountability? 
Officials=11 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Citizens: 
Upper class =13 
Yes Yes Yes Yes May be 
Middle class=13 Yes No Sometimes Yes, but most of 
the cases opinion 
of influential are 
reflected. 
unknown 
Lower class=13 No No No Yes,  unknown 
Total= 50      
 
Note: This table also compiled by various tables of primary data. Data has been collected by author with three 
graduate students in July-October 2014. 
Here official means, 
Chairman=1 
Members=9 
Secretary=1  
Classes of citizens based on economic condition and influence in the study area. 
 
